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In recent months much of the world's attention has been directed 
toward the newly independent nations of Africa. We in the United 
States should be particularly concerned with Africa because it re-
presents a proving ground upon which can be tested the postulate 
that democracy as a form of government and free enterprise as an 
economic institution have an application in nations other than our 
own. 
Since Ghana was the first of the new African nations to gain inde-
pendence and is therefore at least chronologically the most ad-
vanced, it is felt that an examination of its progress will give 
some insight into what we can expect from other African nations in 
the years to come. 
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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
In recent months much of the world's attention has been direct-
ed toward the newly independent nations of Africa. A religion of 
nationalism has swept across the dark continent; leaving in its wake 
millions of illiterate people who have gained an independence which 
they can not understand from colonial masters which they would not 
understand. In some cases, ties which have existed for six hun-
dred years have been severed over night. Constitutions which are 
supposed to last a thousand years have been hurriedly drawn because 
the people could not wait six weeks. Africans everywhere are demand· 
ing the right of state and the right to follow their own purpose. 
We in the United States should be particularly concerned with 
Africa because it represents a proving ground upon which can be test-
ed the postulate that Democracy as a form of government and free 
enterprise as an economic institution have an application in nations 
other than our own. Almost without exception, all of the newly inde-
pendent nations of Africa have adopted a form of government which, 
although generally more socialistic than that of the United States, is 
basically Democratic in nature. Americans are not naive enough to 
expect immediate success. We realize that these things take time. 
i 
state, which itself is far from perfect. Yet, perfection is really not 
the question. The question is whether or not the political and econo-
mic values which we of the western world hold in such high esteem 
can be introduced and maintained in an emerging society. Can the 
vast, raw continent of Africa, which has been locked away from the 
influence of civilization, so much abused as the instrument of other 
nations, and in which a perilously small fraction of the population 
have any knowledge of the arts and sciences necessary to conduct a 
modern state, hope to give anything more than lip service to the ideals 
of democracy. Will these nations be as much in favor of democracy 
when it comes to practicing it as they were when they demanded it? 
It is universally recognized that if any of the African nations have 
a chance of success it is Ghana. Ghana, that small (9 l, 843 square 
miles) west African country which was formerly the British Gold Coast 
Colony. Ghana was the first independent government composed en-
tirely of Africans to be set up in an area once ruled by a colonial 
power. Nationalism and independence came to Ghana without the 
bitterness that repressive colonialism has produced in other parts of 
Africa. The movement for self-government expressed itself largely 
as a revolt against paternalism, taking the form of resentment against 
an alien ruler. The official view of the British toward the Colony has 
ii 
balanced political advance at all levels. It was a joint enterprise 
between senior (British) and junior (Gold Coast) partners. With very 
few misgivings, the British granted Ghanaian independence freely 
and with a spirit of encouragement and cooperation. Britain had 
given the Gold Coast not only economic aid and social service but 
had helped to develop the essential elements which go to make up 
nationhood - a disciplined and experienced civil service, trade 
unions, an impartial judiciary, and, most important, representative 
and responsive political institutions. There had been long years of 
careful tutelage in parliamentary procedure and there had been built 
up an "elite" with proved capacity for leadership. The British policy 
of gradual transfer of power had advanced to the stage where most 
important governmental posts were already filled with elected native 
officials. Even the tribal chiefs were elected and could be deposed 
by popular vote. The evolution from dependency had come about 
rationally on the basis of mutual respect and partnership. 
Ghana was born without many of the problems which have proven 
so disruptive of progress in other African nations. There was no 
"plural community" - that is, there was no large scale immigrant 
population of white settlers (as in Central Africa), or of Indian mer-
chants (as East Africa). All land was owned by the natives; 
iii 
fore no issue of apartheid such has since beset Kenya. There was a 
dollar surplus and the treasury was completely solvent. In compari-
son with other underdeveloped countries it was extremely wealthy 
(the per capita income of $14,0 per year, while meager by our stand-
ards , looked very good when compared with the average African per 
capita income of only $4,0 per year). Gold Coast was not over-populat-
ed. There was no color bar and no racialism. There was no Communist 
Party - and no prospects of one. There was an authentic sense of 
Ghanaian nationhood, a tangible patriotism which promised to over-
come the differences which had historically separated Ghana 1 s tribes . 
Ghana had a growing middle class, a sound economy, and did not 
owe a dollar to anybody. It had an American educated Prime Minister, 
who, in the fashion of Lloyd George, was somewhat of a demagogue 
as well as a statesman. 
In all, everything favored Ghana becoming the showplace of 
democracy in Africa. Ghanaian independence was seen as a "sure 
thing" test of African maturity. The Ghana-type independence was 
heralded as the West's best antidote to communist anti-imperialist, 
anti-colonialist, "Champion of the Black" claims. Black men every-
where regard Ghana as tangible proof that the African negro, too, can 
run his own affairs. 
iv 
ing suspicion that perhaps early interpretations were a bit over-
optimistic, perhaps Ghana's prospects were emphasized and its 
problems deemphasized. Ghana's leader has begun to say that you 
can not transplant, intact, western democracy into impoverished 
and illiterate hands, and that Africa must develop its own democracy. 
The question now is whether or not the end product will be recogniz-
able. 
This paper will attempt to trace in some detail the economic and 
political development of Ghana as a model of over-all West African 
development. In a sense, Ghana might be thought of as a micro-
cosm of the whole area south of the Sahara. Since the backgrounds 
of many of the new nations are in many ways similar, and since Ghana 
was the first of the new nations to gain independence and is there-
fore at least chronologically the most advanced, it is felt that an 
examination of its progress might give some insight into what we can 
expect from other African nations in the years to come. These young 
African nations represent an experiment the outcome of which will 
surely change the course of history. It is essential that we make a 
genuine effort to understand them and the problems they face, for, 
we are all to be affected by what happens in Africa; whether we like 
it or not. 
v 
A History of Ghana and W. W. Claridge's A History of the Gold 
Coast and Ashanti, which should be required reading for anyone 
who desires a complete account of the early history of Ghana. How-
ever, much has happened in Ghana in recent years and there is not 
to my knowledge anything approaching an acceptable summary of 
these events . While I do not pretend to be an expert on Africa, 
and indeed have never even been to Africa; I have done extensive 
preparatory reading, and it is upon such study that this report is 
based. My hope is that this paper will, for the layman, make some 
sense out of the myriad of conflicting accounts, accusations, and 
counter-accusations which have poured out of Ghana and into our 




From early times the Western Sudan was known to be the home 
of a civilized Mohammedan empire and to be rich in gold, ivory, and 
spices. The vast Sahara had made it impossible for European traders 
to reach the source of these treasures via an overland trade route. 
It is perhaps in hopes of finding a sea route to the source of the gold 
supply that Prince Henry of Portugal set out in the early part of the 
fifteenth century to plan and organize exploring expeditions along the 
west coast of Africa. Port Bojador had been until that time the south-
ern extent of European and Arab knowledge. Cape Bojador was a for-
midable obstacle for it was protected by a dangerous reef and heavy 
surf which required seamen to stand well out to sea in order to safely 
pass. The land and sea alike beyond the cape was well known to be 
inhabited by devils; and should one escape the devils he was sure to 
be burned black by the increasing heat of the sun. Prince Henry sent 
several expeditions to try to pass Cape Bojador but each returned un-
successful until in 1433 the Portuguese Captain Gil Eannes, under 
orders from Prince Henry to pass the Cape at all costs, stood boldly 
out to sea, passed the Cape, and made his landfall again on the coast 
and from that time on progress along the African coast was steady. 
As the European sea captains cautiously investigated the coast, 
they named the different stretches of coast according to the princi-
pal cargo they found there. Thus the Grain Coast (now Liberia) , the 
Slave Coast {now Togoland and Nigeria) , the Ivory Coast (still the 
Ivory Coast though it exports only a negligible amount of ivory), and 
the Gold Coast (now Ghana}. In 1471 Fernao Gomez, under contract 
from the King of Portugal, actually reached the Gold Coast itself. The 
entire area was rich in gold and such a busy trade in gold dust sprang 
up that Gomez soon made his fortune. In 1474 the contract with Gomez 
·expired and the monopoly on the trade was taken over by the Portu-
guese government. In order to secure the trade against foreign competi-
tion and from interruption by hostile tribes, the Portuguese built a fort 
in the vicinity of the mouth of the Pra River near what is today the town 
of Cape Coast. Thus the fin::t white settlement was established on the 
Gold Coast. 
The portion of land which these early explorers and traders 
named the Gold Coast is located on the Gulf of Guinea at approxi-
mately . jf7-jfjf N and jf2-jfjf W. In general, the face of the land is 
an undulating plain, as is characteristic of that part of West Africa. 
There are no very high places in the Gold Coast. The source of the 
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public) is only 1, 2%.% feet above sea level and the highest hills with-
in the Gold Coast itself are between 2, 5,%,% and 3, 5%.% feet high. The 
most conspicuous feature on the physical map is the Kwahu Scarp 
which runs for some one hundred and eighty miles from northwest to 
southeast about forty miles inland and due north of what is now Accra. 
The Kwahu Scarp is in many places a sheer cliff rising several hun-
dred feet above the forested plain below. The Kwahu Scarp forms the 
southwest boundary of the Volta River basin and a whole row of small 
rivers flow from its southern face directly to the sea. 1 The Scarp is 
important because of its influence on rainfall and vegetation. The 
prevailing wind for most of the year is from the southwest, it comes 
laden with moisture from the ocean which it precipitates on the sea-
ward face of the Kwahu Plateau. Thus the country is divided into a 
densely forested area to the south of the Scarp and a dry savannah 
and grass area to the north. The forested area of the Gold Coast is 
also the mining area; a fact which was to have considerable economic 
and political importance as time went on. 
1There are no natural harbors on the Gold Coast. As late as 
192,%, Lagos, in Nigeria, was the only modern West African port south 
of Dakar. "The Last Days of an Old Port," Fortune, I.XIII (May 1961), 
pp. 9,%-97. 
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Volta. The Volta has a total length of some nine hundred miles; it 
rises to the north of the Gold Coast in the plateau area of the great 
Niger River and is formed by the junction of the Black Volta on the 
west and the White Volta on the east at a point about two hundred 
and fifty miles from the sea. The Gold Coast might be thought of 
as the lower basin of the Volta River much as Nigeria is the lower 
basin of the Niger. 
The climate of the Gold Coast is as important in the develop-
ment of the country as are any of its physical features. In the early 
days the Gold Coast was known as the ''White Man's Grave" because 
of the malaria, tuberculosis, yellow fever, smallpox, and sleeping 
sickness which ran rampant in the damp heat. Along the coast and 
in the forested area the temperature usually averages about 85 and 
the relative humidity is usually in excess of 8%. Beyond the forested 
area the relative humidity drops considerably and the temperature 
range is much more extreme; the hot weather is hotter and the cold 
weather is colder. Along the coast there are two rainy seasons, from 
April to July and from September to November. To the north of the 
Kwahu Scarp there is only one rainy season, from April through 
October. Both the north and the south experience a severe dry sea-
son from November to March during which the northeast trade wind 
4 
wind dies down and before the rains come there is a period of several 
weeks when the air is completely still and lifeless. All in all, it is 
not a very pleasant place to live. 
It is rather surprising, but historians seem to agree that the 
natives which the Portuguese found on the Gold Coast had themselves 
just arrived or were still arriving. It is generally believed, although 
this theory is by no means universally accepted, that the early tribes 
of the Gold Coast were groups of Akan peoples who migrated from the 
north to escape persecution by Islam. These Akan people were sup-
posedly members of the great Negro Kingdom of Ghana (from which the 
modern Ghana takes its name) which flourished during the medieval 
period and covered a vast expanse of territory from Nigeria in the east 
to Senegambia in the west. Ancient Ghana attained a high degree of 
civilization and carried on extensive trade with the outside world, 
exporting gold, ivory, animal skins, cotton, and corn to such coun-
tries as Spain and Portugal. In 1%76 A.D. the Kingdom of Ghana 
fell before the Moslems and the Akan people, rather than accept sub-
jugation, retreated down the valley of the Niger and Volta Rivers; first 
entering the Gold Coast area about 12.%% A.D.2 These people came 
211Joy on the Gold Coast," Newsweek, XLVIII (October 1956), p. 4! 
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strong enough to establish themselves permanently in a particular 
place and to force those who came later to either go around them or 
to stop before them. There were constant wars between the various 
tribes and each one in turn seems to have had its day. As a result, 
the final wave of immigrants had settled in the coastal area only 
slightly before the arrival of the Portuguese. 3 There seems to be a 
singular lack of written records covering these early events·, and 
most accounts are based on a series of logical deductions. In a very 
real sense, the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth 
century may be taken as the beginning of Gold Coast history. 
While the Portuguese "Guinea Trade" flourished, attempts were 
still being made to find a sea route to the rich markets of India. In 
1494 Vasco De Gama made the first successful Indian voyage; and 
from that time on the Portuguese government's interest in the Gold 
Coast fell off markedly. The forts which the Portuguese had built 
and the garrisons which maintained them were badly neglected as a 
result of the government's preoccupation with the Indian trade. By 
153,0' the forts could no longer maintain the trade monopoly and the 
French were trading openly all along the Gold Coast. The first 
3The chief tribal divisions in Ghana are shown on the map at 
the end of this paper. 
6 
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Portuguese protests, the voyages increased in number until by 156,0 
the English too were engaged in a lucrative trade all along the coast. 
After 15 6,0 European activity on the Gold Coast was in a slack period 
due to more promising new world ventures. In 158,0 Portugal was con-
quered by Philip II of Spain and the Portuguese holdings on the west 
coast of Africa were thus thrown open to attack by Philip's revolted 
subjects· in Holland. The Dutch first went to the Gold Coast in 1595, 
and by 1598 they had established four forts of their own. 
Meanwhile, events in the new world were reviving English in-
terest in the Gold Coast. English settlers were establishing them-
selves in the West Indies, and there was arising a great need for 
slaves to work the sugar plantations. A keen rivalry sprang up be-
tween the British and the Dutch for the profitable slave trade; and the 
British belatedly built their own fort at Kormantine in 1631. In 164,0 
the Portuguese revolted against Spain, gained their independence, and 
immediately got into a war with Holland over Brazil. By the treaty of 
peace which ended the war the Portuguese gave up their rights to the 
Gold Coast in exchange for Dutch rights in Brazil; and thus ended the 
Portuguese rule on the Gold Coast. 
With the departure of the Portuguese, the Dutch moved in to 
establish a monopoly of their own. However, the wealth to be made 
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Dutch found themselves, treaties notwithstanding, unable to secure 
a firm position. In the early 17/f/f's the Gold Coast was regularly 
visited by English, French, Danish, Swedish, and German traders; 
and by the year 178 6 the combined European export of slaves from 
Africa had reached 74 ,/f/f/f per year. 4 Throughout the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries there was a constant building, selling, 
attacking, capturing, and exchanging of forts among and between 
the various European powers and the natives themselves. 
The French, except for an abortive effort in 1688, never really 
made a serious attempt to establish themselves on the Gold Coast; 
being content to strengthen their position farther north on the Senegal. 
The Swedish and German ventures were also both short lived. The 
Danish established their sphere of influence in the extreme eastern 
part of the Gold Coast. The British and the Dutch emerged as the 
strongest powers in the Gold Coast proper. 
In 185/f the Danes sold all their forts to the British and pulled 
out of the Gold Coast. The Danish forts had been built in the arid 
coastal strip east of Accra where there was little chance of develop-
ing a trade in tropical crops. The slave trade had been their great 
4w. E. F. Ward, A History of Ghana (London: George Allen and 
Unwin Limited, 1958), p. 87. It should be pointed out that the supply 
of slaves to the ships was entirely in African hands . The Africans 
jealously guarded their monopoly of the trade. 
8 
1794 the forts on the Gold Coast became a liability. 5 In 1867 the 
Dutch and the British concluded a treaty that was designed to remedy 
the fact that the British and Dutch forts were intermingled and to 
establish a frontier between the tribes over which each had assumed 
jurisdiction. Forts were duly exchanged; the British occupying those 
to the east of the Sweet River and the Dutch occupying those to the 
west. In 18 72 the Dutch, after years of trouble with the natives, 
finally ceded all their possession on the Gold Coast to the British 
and took their departure. 
During this same period there was also a great series of wars, 
and migrations, and consolidations of states among the Gold Coast 
tribes themselves. The native states which exist today all came 
about through a series of military conquests. The many wars, allian-
ces, treaties and confederations in which the natives took part during 
this period are wearisome and confusing to attempt to follow in de-
tail. The notes to the land on which the Europeans had built their 
forts changed hands from time to time and the Europeans thus became 
a partner to several alliances and through these alliances took an 
active part in much of the fighting. The eventual outcome of it all 
SJ. D. Fage, An Introduction to the History of West Africa. 
(Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 101. 
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interior and the Fanti along the coast. 
The Ashanti Confederation was in the beginning a military alliance 
of a group of small inland tribal states. Through a series of military 
conquests and aided by some very fine statesmanship the various 
Asantehenes {kings) of Ashanti managed to build up a fighting force 
which would have put many European armies to shame. The Ashanti 
people were at one time or another at war with almost every tribe on 
the Gold Coast. They were constantly attempting to expand their 
frontiers in all directions; a policy which was mainly caused by econ-
omic necessity. Ashanti was an inland country, and owing to the 
middleman activities of the coastal tribes, European goods could only 
be obtained from the coast at exorbitant prices. The Ashanti people, 
of course, wanted the European goods, and imports must be paid for 
by exports . The export most desired by the Europeans at the time was 
slaves. The best way to get slaves was to conquer them. Thus the 
Ashanti wars served double duty for the Ashanti people - they provided 
slaves and they eliminated the middleman. 
The Fanti states, owing mainly to their more advantageous posi-
tion along the coast, developed a character quite different from that 
of the Ashanti. Where the Ashanti Confederation was a highly cen-
tralized organization of military-minded tribes, the Fanti were a 
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with the European merchants. The Ashanti, being always the ag-
gressor, several times defeated the Fanti army and sacked the 
villages. After each victory the Ashanti, once they had seized all 
the valuables, retreated back into the interior where they remained 
until one Fanti tribe or another failed to forward to them the tribute 
which they demanded by right of conquest. The Europeans were al-
ways aligned with the Fanti against the Ashanti, but it was many 
years before anyone was able to bring the great warriors under con-
trol. 6 
6It must be kept in mind that at this time European authority 
was limited to the area which the guns of their forts could command. 
Although they had mutual protection treaties with many of the Fanti 
tribes, they could in fact only offer protection to the natives living in 
the immediate vicinity of the forts. When European soldiers did ven-
ture into the field they met with limited if any success. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE BRITISH ON THE GOLD COAST 
British activities on the Gold Coast, like those of most European 
countries, were originally in the hands of commercial trading compan-
ies chartered by the government. The British forts on the Gold Coast 
were maintained by the government in exchange for a percentage of 
the profits which the trading companies secured. Because the forts 
were thus maintained by Parliamentary grant, the government demand-
ed that from time to time the trading companies give an account of the 
manner in which they administered the Gold Cast settlements. As 
time passed, there was growing criticism of the companies' control 
of the forts and the idea that the Crown should take over the govern-
ment of the settlements began to gain ground. The companies them-
selves were not entirely adverse to the idea since their main concern 
was with commerce and not with politics. In 18j1°7 the British govern-
ment abolished the slave trade and from that time on the trading com-
panies• affection for the Gold Coast steadily decreased. 
The first British official directly appointed by the Crown arrived 
on the Gold Coast in 1819. In 1821 the British Parliament passed an 
act which abolished the African Company entirely and the Gold Coast 
Leone. In 1826 Ashanti invaded the Fanti country and captured the 
notes to the land on which the British forts stood. The British man-
aged in turn to defeat the Ashanti and recapture the notes . As a result, 
by right of conquest, the land upon which the British had built their 
forts became the absolute property of the Crown. By 1872, as pre-
viously indicated, England was the sole European power left on the 
Gold Coast. 
At first the Crown• s authority on the Gold Coast was limited to 
judicial matters which the natives brought to them for mediation; the 
natives themselves remaining entirely independent of the British gov-
ernment. Gradually the British influence grew, and by the Bond of 
1844 that portion of the Gold Coast which was later to become the 
"Gold Coast Colony" was placed under British protection. 
The people of the protected territory were mostly members of 
Fanti tribes, a fact which was to involve the British in seven semi-
successful wars with the invading Ashanti. Throughout the period 
the British, for one reason or another, failed to follow up any advan-
tage they gained from the Ashanti, and it was not until the famous 
Black Watch was sent to the Gold Coast in 1874 that the British fin-
ally succeeded in actually invading Ashanti territory and burning 
their capital at Kumasi. In that same year the "Gold Coast Colony" 
13 
although Ashanti maintained its independence from the Crown, the 
Ashanti were thereafter kept more or less under control. In 19_%1, 
spurred on by the threat of French and German colonial expansion on 
both sides of the Gold Coast, the British finally annexed the Kingdom 
of Ashanti and the territory to the north of Ashanti. 7 The northern-
most territory in the Gold Coast was to be known, appropriately, as 
the "Northern Territory." Thus, the British Colony of the Gold Coast 
as it existed on the day of independence was formed. The eastern 
boundary was formed by the Anglo-German Boundary Commissions of 
188 6 and 1888. The western and northern boundary was established 
by three Anglo-French Boundary Commissions in 1889, 1893, and 1898. 
Of course, the boundaries thus drawn were determined without refer-
ence to African wishes, with the result that both on the east and on 
the west African political units were divided by arbitrary frontier lines. 
Politically, the British followed their traditional system of Col-
ial Government. The initial colonial constitution provides for a 
central government composed of a Governor (High Commissioner or re-
sident) , an Executive Body, and a Legislative Council. The Governor 
has ultimate authority over the affairs of the colony usually with the 
7w. E. Simnett, The British Colonial Empire (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Limited, 19 49) , p. 7 4. 
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any bill rejected by the Legislature when such an over-ride was 
deemed "expedient in the interest of public order, public faith, or 
8 good government. " The Executive Body is usually composed of five 
or six members whose function it is to advise the Governor. At its 
inception the Executive Body is made up entirely of British officials 
responsible only to the Governor. Eventually the British officials are 
replaced, first by members appointed from the Legislature by the 
Governor, and later by members popularly elected from and by the 
Legislature. In the last stages of the Colonial government the elected 
members of the Council are given charge of a government department 
and the Council becomes much like a cabinet whose responsibility is 
no longer to the Governor but rather to the Legislature and through the 
Legislature to the people. 
The Legislative Council is originally composed of British officials 
(majority) and leading citizens appointed by the Governor. Later, some 
of the appointed members are elected by the people, the number grad-
ually increasing until elected members are in the majority. The elect-
ed members are selected in the following way: the people of a parti-
cular village elect a member of their group to sit on a District Council, 
Bsir Charles Jeffries, Transfer of Power (New York: Fredrick A. 
Praeger, 1961), p. 34. 
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and the Regional Council elects members to sit in the Central Legis-
lature. In the stage of development which normally just proceeds 
independence, the members of the Central Legislature are directly 
elected by the people from candidates nominated by political parties. 
The first Legislative Council was set up in the "Gold Coast 
Colony" in 1874; but until 1925 there were no elected members in the 
Council. In 1925 a new constitution provided that six of the fourteen 
unofficial members of the Council be elected. In 19 4 6 still another 
constitution provided that the number of elected officials be increased 
to the point where elected officials held the majority. The 1946 Con-
stitution also provided that Ashanti be represented for the first time 
(prior to 1946 the Governor had legislated for Ashanti and the "Northern 
Territory") . The placing of the legislature in the hands of elected offi-
cials marked a stage of constitutional advance which had hitherto not 
been attained by any other colonial territory in Africa. 
By 1946 all high posts in the government were theoretically open 
to Africans , however, they were, in fact, still held by officials of the 
United Kingdom. Under the 1946 Constitution the Executive Council 
contained African members but they were not elected from the members 
of the Legislature and thus were not responsible to the Legislature 
but directly to the Governor. Their position was not one of making 
16 
by the British officials. 
The 1946 Constitution was, in general, greeted by the Gold 
Coast people with much enthusiasm. However, it was still a long 
way from self government and it failed to solve the most pressing 
political problem - that is, what to do about the native chiefs. From 
the beginning of British rule right up until today, the question of the 
relationship between the Central Government and the traditional 
native authority has been the most important and difficult problem 
which the Gold Coast governments have had to solve. The British 
took the position that the native chiefs could exercise no legal power 
until such power was granted to them by the Crown. Many African 
leaders, on the other hand, claimed that the rights of the chiefs 
were inherent and in no way derived from the Crown. The British in 
an attempt to satisfy both the need.for a strong Central Government 
while maintaining the traditional tribal associations, passed a num-
ber of ordinances which delineated in some detail the powers which 
belonged to the Central Government and those which belonged to the 
chiefs. These ordinances, of course, failed to placate the native 
authorities who claimed that the British system of indirect rule was 
a farce. There was indirect rule in trivial matters and in matters of 
particular interest to the village folk, but in major affairs, that is 
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Coast was ruled directly. In addition, the British position was made 
even more untenable by the reactions of the new educated leaders of 
the Gold Coast to the ordinances. The educated leaders could see 
that the hope for independence lay in the establishment of a smooth 
running Central Government. They ridiculed the mysticism and fet-
ishism so often associated with the rule of the native chiefs, and they 
fought every move which did not in one way or the other detract from 
the power of the chiefs. The British were therefore caught between 
the two conflicting forces and every move the government made was 
sure to offend someone. It was a problem which the British never 
were able to solve and they left it as a legacy to the new independent 
government in 1957. 
While the 1946 Constitution was not entirely satisfactory from a 
political viewpoint, it was economics and not politics which brought 
about the most severe criticism of the government. There were two 
major grievances. The first concerned the threat to the cocoa indus-
try by a disease known as 11 swollen shoot. 11 It was a virus disease 
carried by an insect known as the mealy bug. The disease could 
spread rapidly through a whole grove of cocoa trees once it got a 
start, and as there was at the time no effective insecticide, the 
government agricultural officials felt that the only way to combat the 
18 
In some cases this meant that a cocoa farmer's entire farm might need 
to be destroyed. The cocoa farmers, because they did not understand 
how a virus worked and because they refused to believe that the dis-
ease could utterly destroy the entire industry, refused to obey the 
government order to cut down the trees. They accused the government 
of all sorts of schemes which were designed to make the new freedom 
gained under the 1946 constitution meaningless. The government 
was determined to wreck the country's economy, to make the land 
worthless and then to buy it up for almost nothing, to destroy the Gold 
Coast cocoa industry and thus give Trinidad and Nigeria a chance to 
compete, and so on. What good was freedom without a sound economy 
to back it up? 
At the time when the government thus had its hands full with the 
farmers , other events were taking place which put the officials also 
in the bad graces of the townspeople. In the period following WW II 
the world price for cocoa had soared with the result that there was 
9The mealy bug is extremely difficult to exterminate. The bug is 
associated with a ground ant which builds a protective tent over the 
bug as it attacks the roots of the cocoa tree. The ant then feeds from 
the bug's honey. John Gunther, "Inside Africa's Gold Coast," 
Colliers, CXXXIII (May 1954), PP. 34-4.0'. 
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pean firms had not yet fully converted their plants to the production 
of peacetime goods. With so much money in the hands of the Gold 
Coast people and such a scarcity of goods , it was inevitable that 
prices for the available goods would climb rapidly and the black market 
would flourish. The people, of course, blamed the government for the 
high prices, claiming that the government was in collusion with Euro-
pean suppliers who were keeping prices high in retaliation for the high 
price they had to pay for cocoa. 
The British Government seemed powerless to do anything about the 
problem of the farmers or that of the townspeople. Burning the cocoa 
trees was the only known way of stopping the spread of the "swollen 
shoot. 0 The only way to cut high prices was to import more goods, 
which at the time was impossible. Unrest and uneasiness grew, and 
on 28 February 1948 things came to a head. 
A group of ex-servicemen, who were finding it difficult to re-
adjust to their humble position in civilian life after having seen what 
the rest of the world was like, asked for permission to hold a rally in 
Accra and from there to march in procession to the Governor's castle 
in order to present a petition concerning the ex-servicemen's griev-
ances against the government. They were told that permission could 
not be given for a large group of men to march to the Governor's castle, 
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they could hold the rally and thereafter, in order to draw public atten-
tion to their grievances, they could march through the strees of Accra 
if they so desired. The petitioners accepted these conditions without 
objection. 
As the procession marched through the streets, it was joined by 
others who were not ex-servicemen. The group soon left the prescribed 
route of march and turned towards the Governor's castle. A short way 
from the castle they were met by a small force of armed British police. 
The mob took no heed of the order to disperse, or of the warning that 
force would be used if necessary. The police tried tear gas which was 
ineffective; and, after several were injured by stones, they fired. Six 
shots were fired; two of the ringleaders were killed and four others 
wounded. The mob did not disperse until troops arrived about an hour 
later. Rioting had meanwhile broken out in Accra; the central prison 
was stormed and the inmates released. The Government refrained from 
attempting to halt the riots on the grounds that looting was preferable 
to the killing which was sure to take place should an open clash be-
tween the rioters and the police be precipitated. Rioting spread to 
several other cities, but in a few days the force of the mob had spent 
itself and things were nearly back to normal. 
In the meantime, the leaders of the Gold Coast Convention, a 
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ized opposition to the government, seized upon the opportunity to 
assert themselves. They sent a telegram to the government in London 
claiming that civil administration had broken down and offering their 
services in forming an interim government. However, the Gold Coast 
government hurriedly restored order itself and shipped the leaders of 
the Gold Coast Convention to distant parts of the country so as to 
keep them from causing further trouble. 
The government in London appointed a Commission to inquire into 
the disturbances and their underlying causes. The Commission's re-
port amounted to a sustained criticism of the Gold Coast government. 
The main causes of the rioting were found to be: the "swollen shoot" 
problem, the discontent of the ex-servicemen over pensions and re-
settlement, high prices, political frustration among the educated 
natives over the inadequacy of the 1946 Constitution, and the concen-
tration of economic power in the hands of Europeans . The Commission 
felt that the Gold Coast government was completely out of touch with 
the feelings of the people, and recommended, even though the griev-
ances. of 1948 were mainly economic, that it was time for further con-
stitutional advance along with improvement in the government's public 
relations program. 
As a result of these recommendations, the government in London 
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tails of a new constitution. This Commission made extensive propos-
als for changes in both the central and local governments. Principally, 
it recommended a clean break with the traditional form of colonial 
government and the establishment of a government very similar to that 
of Britain. The new Legislature was to have an upper and lower house 
composed almost entirely of elected officials or, barring that, a single 
house of one hundred and sixteen members also mostly elected. The 
Executive Council was to take a form similar to the British Cabinet 
except that it would not be a party cabinet but rather a cabinet com-
posed of members elected from and by the Legislature (or Parliament). 
The Governor was to be the chairman of the twelve man Cabinet and 
the elected members, who were to have Department responsibility, were 
to resign as a body if defeated on a division. The members of the Par-
liament were to be elected directly by the people. The franchise was 
to be given to all taxpayers over the age of twenty one. 
The government in London accepted the proposals of the Commis-
sion as representing a worthy goal to be attained as soon as possible 
but one which under the circumstances was impractical. The chief 
difficulty in accepting such a system was that at the time there was 
not a real political party worthy of the name on the Gold Coast. With-
out party leadership the African officials would still be in the position 
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tiating policy themselves. After all, if the system was to function, 
as was its intention, in a manner similar to that of the London gov-
ernment it was necessary to have both party leadership and a loyal 
opposition. 
At this point there seemed to be no doubt in anyone's mind that 
the Gold Coast was moving rapidly toward independence, the only 
question seemed to be how soon independence would be attained. It 
might be wise to digress here for a moment to investigate the reasons 
why events at this particular time seemed to be moving rapidly toward 
Gold Coast independence. 
The reasons are both internal and external to the Gold Coast it-
self. Internally, there was a natural maturity of an educational system 
which by the mid 193%'s had begun to turn out graduates with the train-
ing and confidence to occupy responsible positions and the ability to 
10 
voice their political discontent. In addition, there had been an in-
crease in the number of people living in the towns with the resultant 
lOEducation began on the Gold Coast in mission schools estab-
lished by the Methodist, Catholic, Basel, and Bremen churches. 
Achimota College {later the University College of Ghana) was estab-
lished at Accra in 1924. In 1951, the Colonial Government built a tech-
nical college at Kumasi. The British sent a good number of gifted natives 
to European schools; however, the type of education these people re-
ceived has been the subject of much criticizm since it prepared them to 
enter a profession rather than a technical field. The Gold Coast had a 
greater need for carpenters than it did for clerks. 
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the new, more educated leaders. Servicemen returning from the war 
had had their horizons broadened by what they had seen in other parts 
of the world. The people who had remained at home during the war 
expected to be rewarded for the loyalty to the home government which 
they had demonstrated. The widely publicized communist doctrine 
of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and exhaltation of the "toiling 
masses" probably influenced the thinking of the Gold Coast people, 
even though they did not consciously accept the doctrine or even 
identify it as such. The educated Gold Coast leaders were aware of 
events in India, Ceylon, and Burma, and they could easily sense that 
Britain was relaxing her political grasp and that perhaps now was the 
time to strike while the iron was hot. All of these factors were aided 
and abetted by the fact that the British policy of civil liberty in the 
Colony permitted the local press to damn all acts of the government-
good, bad, or indifferent. 
Externally, the world was a different place than it had been be-
fore the war. Britain had been wrecked by the war and this subtly 
altered her position as a ruler of colonial peoples. The United King-
dom had faced extreme danger and had been forced to ask for strenu-
ous military and economic service from her colonies on a basis of 
willing cooperation. The British Labor Party had grown in strength 
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in the Colonies toward self-government. The United Nations in gen-
era! and the United States and Russia in particular were applying 
pressure for self-determination for all peoples, And finally, the 
British themselves felt that they could not morally subdue the agita-
tion for self-government by repressive force, and there was therefore 
no alternative but to grant the people their wishes. All in all, it 
might be said that the time was simply right. l'l 
At any rate, if the British Government was concerned about the 
lack of a solid political party on the Gold Coast its anxiety was to be 
soon relieved. In June 1949, while the Commission was in the midst 
of its deliberations on constitutional advance, the Secretary of the 
Gold Coast Convention broke with the party and instituted a new party 
to be known as the Convention People's Party (CPP). The Secretary's 
name was Dr. Kwame Nkrumah - but in years to come he was to be 
better known to the Gold Coast pepple as "the redeemer, " "the 
llThe British had long claimed that they were preparing the depen-
dent territories for eventual self-government, however, it was not until 
the advent of the Labor Government of Clement Attlee that any British 
government officially adopted the policy of looking toward self-government 
for all dependent territories as soon as they were capable of it. The 
policy was stated in a white paper issued by the British government in 
June, 1948: "The central purpose of the British colonial policy is simple. 
It is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-government 
within the commonwealth in conditions that insure to the people con-
cerned a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression in any quar-
ter." Stewart E. Easton, The Twilight Qf_European Colonialism (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 196,0), p. 31. 
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Kwame Nkrumah was born in 19,09 in a small village near Axim. 
He received his early education in a Catholic mission school and then 
spent four years at Achimota College preparing to be a teacher. In 
1937 an uncle agreed to finance his voyage to the United States in order 
that he might further his education. Once in the United States, Nkrumah 
enrolled at Lincoln (Pa.) University where he majored in economics and 
sociology; working his way through school by waiting tables and work-
ing as a dock hand during the summer. Upon graduation from Lincoln 
in 1939 he entered the University of Pennsylvania where he took his 
Masters degrees in Theology and Education. 12 At the close of WW" II 
he went to London where he studied law, however, he failed his exam -
!nations and was not admitted to the bar. At the age of thirty-six he 
was broke and living in a shabby lodging in the east side of London. 
In 1947, Dr. Joseph P. Danquah the leader of the Gold Coast Conven-
tion, casting about for an energetic young man to take charge of the 
Gold Coast Convention party machine I asked Nkrumah to return home 
and take the position as paid Secretary of the Party. Nkrumah con-
sented. He soon proved to be a first rate organizer and under his di-
rection the party machinery began to take shape. However, he soon 
12Nkrumah holds an honorary LL. D. from Lincoln University. 
"Redemption's End, " Time, LXXVII (January 19 61) , P. 45 · 
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with regard to independence. The party stand was for independence 
as soon as possible: Nkrumah, on the other hand, advocated "self-
government now. 1113 When Nkrumah bolted from the party in 1949 
he took the Gold Coast Convention's political machine and most of 
the party members with him. Under Nkrumah's leadership the CPP 
immediately embarked on an energetic program of non-violent strikes 
and boycotts designed to bring the economy to a standstill and thus 
bring greater pressure to bear on the British government. However, 
the strikes soon got out of hand and rioting broke out in many of the 
villages. As a result, Nkrumah and some of his aides were arrested 
for sedition and sentenced to jail. 
Despite the rioting and uneasiness, or perhaps because of it, 
the government in London was determined to go ahead with its plan 
for constitutional advance on the Gold Coast. While the leaders of the 
CPP were still serving their terms in jail, the government announced 
its plan for the new constitution. In general the government's plan 
followed the recommendations of the Commission. There was to be a 
· Legislative Assembly of one house, containing seventy-five elected 
and nine nominated officials. Thirty-eight of the elected members were 
13"Ferment on the Gold Coast," Reader's Digest, I.XII (May 1953), 
pp. 139-142. 
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pointed through four State Councils of the native authorities (the 
Colony, Ashanti, the Northern Territory, and Trans-Volta). The Execu-
tive Council was to have the Governor as chairman, three European 
members, and eight African members elected from the Assembly. The 
African members were to have ministerial responsibility . 14 
The new constitution, while a long step forward, could hardly be 
considered "self-government now," and there was much conjecture as 
to what the reaction of the CPP would be. It was here that Dr. Nkrumah 
gave the first evidence that he was something more than just an agita-
tor. While making it quite clear that he was by no means completely 
satisfied, he promised that the CPP would have a go at it and that the 
party would take part in the elections to be held in February 19 51 . 
The government then undertook the formidable task of conducting 
a general election in a country where 8,%% of the population was illi-
terate. The first step was to recruit one hundred educated Africans 
and to thoroughly school them in the procedure to be followed in the 
election. In October 195,% these trained Africans boarded fifteen vans 
and set out to tramp the bush and explain the election to the natives. 
Each van was equipped with loud speakers, movies, and records, 
14John R. E. Carr -Gregg, "Self-rule in Africa," International 
Conciliation, No. 473 (September 1951), pp. 323-376. 
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,six weeks the vans covered 22 ,,0,0,0 miles and visited l, 3%% fishing 
villages, cocoa farms and gold and diamond mines. 15 Each candidate 
for office was assigned a symbol, such as a fish on a blue background 
or a bear on a brown background, so that the natives could express 
their preference without being required to read or even pronounce the 
name of the candidate. The natives were told that their thumb would 
be stamped with indelible ink at the time they placed their ballot so 
as to guard against repeaters, and that if any one attempted to inter-
fere with the election or to intimidate any voter he would be punished 
severely. In all some 663 ,,0,0% natives registered to vote. 
At the time, the CPP was, much to the distress of the British, 
the only organized political machine in the country. This is not sur-
prising since once the CPP had come out for "self-government now" 
anyone who opposed it was put in the position of being against self-
government. However, it is a tribute to Dr. Nkrumah's organizing 
ability that, even though he and most of the other leaders of the 
party were in jail, the machine functioned so well that 8,0% of the 
votes went to the CPP. 16 When the results of the election were in, 
15 "Election - and Jubilee," Time ,LVII (February 1951) , P. 33 
l 6There was a great deal of fetishism attached to Nkrumah; he 
was pictures as a huge white tomcat who wandered from jail nightly. 
'Tomcat Triumphant," Newsweek, XXXVII (February 1951), pp. 41-42. 
30 
on the inauguration of the new Constitution. 11 Under the 1951 Consti-
tution the Gold Coast became the first British colonial territory to have 
elected negroes in a ministerial position. All the elected seats on the 
Executive Council went to members of the CPP and Dr. Nkrumah was 
given the position of "Leader of Government Business, 11 a position on 
the Executive Council second in seniority only to that of "Minister for 
Defense and External Affairs'' a position which remained in the hands 
of a British official. In 1952 Queen Elizabeth II appointed Dr. Nkrumah 
Prime Minister of the Gold Coast and the Executive Council was re-
named the Cabinet. 
During the next several years, Nkrumah 1s actions seemed to sub-
stantiate earlier impressions that he possessed personal qualities be-
yond those which are required of a good speechmaker. Once Nkrumah 
became convinced that the British were truly interested in securing a 
genuine transfer of responsibility, he abandoned his old hostile stand; 
and a spirit of good will and confidence gradually began to grow be-
tween the Nkrumah government and the British. To be sure, Nkrumah 
continued to do all within his power to bring about an early independ-
ence, but he now seemed to realize that independence could be sooner 
accomplished by proving that the Gold Coast was capable of handling 
the responsibility of independence rather than just capable of demand-
ing it. 
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pitable, the age old problem of central government - native authority 
relations gradually deepened. Since Nkrumah's CPP had polled 8,if% 
of the votes in the 1951 elections, it might be assumed that the 
Legislative Assembly was solidly behind the Prime Minister. This 
was not the case, for although the CPP was the only modern political 
party on the Gold Coast in 1951, it was by no means unopposed. The 
CPP was an organization headed in the main by young educated natives 
who had broken with the old tribal ways and who felt that power in the 
hands of the chiefs was an obstacle to progress. The chiefs, of 
. 
course, resisted any attempt by the party to usurp any authority which 
they felt traditionally belonged to them. The 1951 Constitution, it 
will be recalled, provided that thirty-eight of the seats in the Legisla-
tive Assembly be filled by elected representatives but had reserved 
thirty-seven seats for the native authorities {chiefs) . Thus Nkrumah 
and his Cabinet were forced to work through an Assembly which was 
often hostile. Nkrumah consistently maintained that he was willing to 
work with the chiefs and that he was not in favor of restricting their 
power in any way. It is apparent, however, that he was convinced 
from the start that modern ways and tribal ways are not compatible; 
and that if the Gold Coast was to take its place on the international 
stage the real power must lie in a central government. Nkrumah's 
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thinly disguised attempt to make the best of an unfortunate (from his 
viewpoint) situation. 
There could be little doubt that the government could carry the 
rest of the country with it when it was engaged in the struggle for in-
dependence, or in planning for educational or economic advance. 
Therefore, Nkrumah concentrated his efforts in these areas and avoid-
ed those areas which might bring the government and the traditional 
authorities into open conflict. He established a technical college 
at Kumasi, tripled government monetary assistance to secondary 
schools, instituted an emergency plan for teacher training, and <level-
oped a plan which called for a basic six year primary program for all 
children. On the economic front, the government undertook to expand 
the artificial harbor at Tokoradi, to improve the roads, to increase the 
area served by railroads, and to step up plans for the Volta River pro-
ject.17 
All of these programs were undertaken in such an efficient and 
businesslike manner that the British could not help but to be impress-
ed. In addition, when charges of graft were made against members of 
his organization, Nkrumah made no effort to quiet the possible 
17The Volta River project will be discussed in some detail in a 
following chapter. 
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Only a few minor officials were found guilty and they were quickly 
sent to prison. When evidence came to light that some members of the 
CPP were flirting with Communism, Nkrumah summarily expelled them 
from the party. As a result, the British were pleased with Nkrumah's 
statesmanship and with his government in general. Through it all, 
Nkrumah felt that progress was being hindered by the presence of the 
thirty-seven non-elected members in the Legislative Assembly and by 
the presence of the three European members in the Cabinet. In 1954 
he asked for and was granted changes in the Constitution which were 
designed to remedy the situation. 
The 1954 Constitution provided for an Assembly of one hundred and 
four members, all elected on ordinary party lines, with no special or 
nominated members. The Cabinet was to consist of at least eight per-
sons, all members of the Assembly and all chosen on the advice of the 
Prime Minister. The Cabinet was finally to be an all-African all-party 
Cabinet. Authority in the areas of defense and foreign affairs was still 
to be exercised by the Governor. 
The 1954 elections were a foregone conclusion. The CPP won 
seventy-nine seats in the Assembly as compared with fourteen for the 
Northern People's Party which provided the chief organized opposition 
to the government. The CPP was now firmly in the saddle and it seemed 
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The traditional native authorities were, however, not yet ready 
to buckle under. Shortly after the 1954 Assembly met, a party calling 
itself the "National Liberation Movement" was formed. The NLM was 
a curious alliance of tribal conservatives and intellectuals who felt 
that the CPP was becoming altogether too powerful. The movement 
was especially strong in Ashanti, where it had the open support of the 
Asantehene and where members of both the CPP and the Northern 
People's Party were leaving their respective parties and filling its 
ranks. The _principle aim of the NLM, other than generally criticiz-
ing the CPP, was to bring about the enactment at independence of a 
federal constitution. Its members advocated a federation of states 
which would preserve the authority of the local c.hiefs and give a re-
gion more direct control over its own resources. On the other hand, 
the CPP still preferred a government similar in style to that of the 
British Horne Government. 
When Nkrumah's government proposed a Committee of the Assem-
bly to draw up a draft of the Constitution, the NLM refused to take 
part in the proceedings claiming that public o~inion had since the 
election turned against the CPP and that Nkrumah's government there-
fore no longer represented the people. The British, although happy to 
see some real opposition to the CPP, began to express doubts as to 
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Nkrumah's statesmanship again saved the day. He dissolved the As-
sembly in which he held such a strong majority and called for a general 
election. He extracted a promise from the British that they would be 
"ready to accept a motion calling for independence within the Common-
wealth passed by a reasonable majority in the newly elected Legisla-
ture, 
11 
and he went to the polls . The results of the election gave the 
CPP control of seventy-two out of one hundred and four seats in the 
Assembly. The British government considered the results as a clear 
mandate from the people and accepted the motion for independence 
forwarded to it by the Nkrumah government. The United Kingdom Parlia-
ment set March 6, 1957 as the date upon which the Gold Coast was to 
become the independent nation of Ghana. 
The new nation of Ghana was to consist not only of that territory 
which had previously been the British Gold Coast Colony but also the 
13 ,jfjfjf square mile area which had formerly been the British Trust Terri-
tory of Togoland. 
At the close of WW I the German Colony of Togoland (immediately 
to the east of the Gold Coast) had been divided in half and placed un-
der the Trusteeship of the League of Nations. The British were to ad-
minister the western part of Togoland and the French were to administer 
the eastern half. The British, first under the auspices of the League of 
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ed their part of Togo land as an integral part of the Gold Coast. The 
people of British Togoland had had representation on both the Nation-
al Assembly of the Gold Coast and on the Regional Councils of the 
Northern Territory and Trans-Volta. The United Nations was satisfied 
with the stewardship of both the British and the French with regard to 
the Togoland Trust Territory and, although various proposals had been 
made to the United Nations from time to time, little had been done to 
finally settle the Togoland question. However, when it became ap-
parent that the Gold Coast was soon to attain an independent status, 
Britain notified the United Nations that it would no longer be in a 
position to administer the Trusteeship once the Gold Coast became an 
independent nation. 
Committee IV (Trusteeships) of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations was therefore faced with the problem of proposing a resolution 
to the General Assembly as to the ultimate fate of British Togoland. 
The Committee held a series of hearings at which time a number of 
recommendations were entertained; in the end it was decided that a 
' plebiscite would be held in British Togoland so that the people could 
decide: if they desired to join the Gold Coast, if they wished to be 
united with French Togoland (a position which many observers felt 
was not economically viable) , or if they desired 11 some other self-
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the United Nations and the first ever held in a Trust Territory, was 
conducted on May 9, 1956. The results of the referendum showed 
that the people of the territory desired that the Trust Agreement be 
terminated in favor of integration with the Gold Coast. A resolution 
to that effect was placed before the General Assembly of the United 
Nations and on December 13, 1956 was duly passed. The resolution 
was to take effect on the date of Ghana• s independence. 
Before leaving this discussion of Ghana's development under 
British rule, it is important to emphasize one more point. The Gold 
Coast had under the British developed a one crop economy. Gold had 
been the cause for the original European interest in the area; but with 
the coming of the more profitable slave trade gold mining had been all 
but forgotten. As the European countries one by one abolished the slave 
trade, gold and timber again became the chief exports of the Gold Coast. 
In later years large deposits of bauxite, manganese, and industrial 
diamonds were also to be found. But the mining of these materials 
was and still is under the direction of wealthy foreign companies which 
' lease the rights from the government. This arrangement is not much 
different from that which is followed in almost every other African 
l8 11ANew Ohapter in the Togoland Story, 11 United Nations Review, l 
(January 1955), pp. 8-79. 
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people of the Gold Coast were to come to enjoy. The economic for-
tunes of the Gold Coast were and are inseparably tied to one crop -
cocoa. 
Cocoa was first smuggled into the Gold Coast from the Island of 
San Thome in 1879. The climate of the Gold Coast in the forested area 
to the south of the Kwahu Scarp proved to be ideal and the crop flour-
ished until by 1935 the Gold Coast was exporting half the world's 
supply of cocoa. Cocoa was thus to bring to the Gold Coast a wealth 
far greater than that enjoyed by any other country in West Africa. But 
cocoa brought more than wealth to the Gold Coast; it had also a social 
effect which from a political viewpoint is no less important than the 
crop itself was from an economic viewpoint. The cocoa industry is 
remarkable in that it is almost entirely a peasant industry. While 
gold is for the big European companies, cocoa is the affair of the 
small African farmer. The average Gold Coast cocoa farm was only 
about six acres and was run by the native himself. The Gold Coast 
farmer was on his own. One wonders if the rapid advance toward in-
dependence would have been possible without the feeling of self-




THE INDEPENDENT NATION OF GHANA 
- POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS -
At midnight on 5 March 1957, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah 
stood before a massive crowd in Accra's Black Star Square and said, 
"At last the long battle is ended - Ghana, our beloved country, is 
19 free forever." From that moment on, the British government ceased 
to have any authority in Ghana. Hopes were high, not only in Ghana 
itself but throughout the free world. Here was a nation founded on 
solid ground. Ghana had served a long tutelage under the British: 
and now she was ready. Ghana was, in fact already a functioning, 
healthy democracy. 
Prime Minister Nkrumah pledged that his government, now that 
independence was a reality, would turn all its resources· to furthering 
the development of the country. Ghana's foreign policy was to be one 
of positive neutralism and non-alignment. It was, in Nkrumah's words , 
not to be the type "which implies the suspension of judgment; but 
1911Birthday of a Nation," Time, IXIX (March 1957), p. 29. 
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of friendly relations with all countries and unswerving loyalty to the 
United Nations as well as respect for its decisions (on 8 March 195 7, 
Ghana became the eighty-first member of the United Nations) . Ghana 
was to take a position of non-alignment not because of indifference, 
but because Nkrumah did not feel that his tiny country could influence 
the outcome of the cold war and so did not wish to become involved 
and because the Ghanaian Government wished to be free to judge each 
case on its merits. 
Statesmen the world over applauded Nkrumah's declaration, and 
many marveled that such an apparently mature stand should be taken 
by such a young country. There was, indeed, reason to have high 
hopes for Ghana. 
Sixty-nine nations and territories sent representatives to witness 
the birth of Ghana. The Dutchess of Kent, Aunt of Queen Elizabeth II, 
represented the United Kingdom. Vice President Nixon carried the 
greetings of President Eisenhower and the United States to the infant 
nation. Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, under-secretary of the United Nations, 
represented the Secretary General at the ceremonies. Gifts poured ini 
the United States presented Ghana with a two thousand volume tech-
nical library, and the Soviet Union gave Nkrumah a jet transport. 
Independence for Ghana was a gala occasion. But, even as the 
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some informed observers, a nagging suspicion that all might not be 
well. 20 During the week of independence Nkrumah had sent a force 
of mobile police into the south Togoland Districts of Kpandu and Hohoe 
to put down disturbances caused by supporters of the Togoland Con-
gress Party (the Togoland Congress Party had voted against the unifi-
cation of British Togoland with Ghana) . The mobile police force was 
nothing more than a riot squad and it employed tactics which were 
considered unnecessarily "tough" in conducting a house to house 
search for the instigators of the disturbances. If these tactics were 
a preview of things to come, it was sure that Nkrumah was in for 
trouble from such areas as Ashanti, which had no desire to throw off 
British domination only to fall under that of a strong man from semi-
Europeanized Accra. 
20Ghana 's flag has three broad vertical stripes, on which is 
superimposed a black star. 
Stripes: 
Red - Commemorating those who worked for the Colony's 
independence. 
Gold- For the nation's wealth and its old name. 
Dark Green - For the forests and farms of the country. 
Black Star (five pointed): Represents the Lodestar of African 
freedom. "A New African Nation - Ghana," United Nations Review, 
111 (April 195 7) I pp• 24-31. 
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ways strongly supported Nkrumah in his fight to lead Ghana to inde-
pendence had some strange ideas of what independence would mean 
to them personally. Reporters from American magazines and news-
papers interviewed people on the streets, asking them what effect 
they thought independence would have upon them. Such replies as, 
"The cocoa marketing board will distribute its reserves among us -
£ 12 each," or, "In order to get them into circulation the new Ghana 
Bank notes will be distributed free - i 5% each, " were not uncommon. 
It was certain that the new government had nothing of the kind in mind, 
and observers speculated about the reaction of the people when none 
of these windfalls came to pass. 
These things were, however, not really serious, for, human 
nature probably requires that people taking part in a new venture ex-
pect more from it than logic would dictate, and a little dissension 
among the parties to any undertaking is not necessarily a bad thing. 
The real enigma was Nkrumah and his driving ambition. It had been 
apparent for some time that Nkrumah pictured Ghana as the crucible 
in which the fires of African freedom would be kindled. Some ob-
servers felt that Nkrumah hoped to create in his little country an 
"African Personality'' - a political and emotional mistic which would 
lead the rest of the continent toward his dream of a United States of 
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the fight for independence were behind and that ahead lay the works-
day world of making democracy function, many wondered if he really 
believed it. The question was how long Nkrumah, now that Ghanaian 
independence was secured, could keep his messianic vision within 
his own borders . At any rate, if he did, in fact, have plans for a 
great African union it was certain that he must move to secure his 
position at home so that he need fear no nonsense from that quarter 
while he was engaged with matters on a grander scale. 
Fears of trouble ahead for Ghana were, however, entertained by 
only a very few, and in general Ghanaian independence was christ-
ened with great expectations . 
Not long after independence it became apparent that Ghana was, 
indeed, having difficulty. British rule had evidently been the unifying 
force over the hodge-podge of Ghana's diverse tribes, and as soon as 
the British were safely gone many of the up-country tribal chiefs moved 
to regain some of the stature they had lost to the Central Government. 
Some of the chiefs openly threatened seccession. Nkrumah countered 
with decisiveness. He cut off the Central Government's allotment to 
the recalcitrant chiefs, and he warned that if they persisted they would 
be stripped of their titles and deported. Most of the chiefs backed 
down and agree~ to let local elected officials run .the show in exchange 
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refused to change their minds, and _Nkrumah ordered that they be 
summarily deported. The chiefs appealed their case to the courts; 
whereupon Nkrumah rushed a special bill through the Legislature 
which authorized the immediate expulsion of the chiefs , even though 
they were citizens of Ghana. 
When the case was presented to the court, Nkrumah's Attorney 
General defined the bill and the deportations on the grounds that 
Ghana 1s Parliament "has absolute and complete power to legislate on 
any subject whatever. 1121 . The British lawyer who acted on the part 
of the plaintiffs protested that the statute broke the fundamental right 
of a citizen to live in his own country. The statute was upheld and 
the deportations were carried out. 
The United Party, which had become the chief opposition to the 
CPP after the demise of the National Liberation Movement over the 
constitution question, seized upon the deportation incidents as a 
basis for promoting anti-government demonstrations, and during the 
summer of 1957 these anti-government demonstrations led to rioting in 
2 lMany British observers feel that the deportations were origi-
nally the Attorney General's idea. The Attorney General is Geoffrey 
Bing, a white Oxford-educated lawyer. Bing made a name for him-
self as one of Britain's most left-wing Laborite M.P. 's after the war. 
'White Eminence, 11 Time, I.XX (September 195 7), p. 33. 
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"preservation of the established order." He appointed Krobo (Crowbar) 
Edusei Interior Minister, a position from which he could control the 
' 
police. Edusei was a maverick Ashanti who had been a member of 
one of Nkrumah's earlier cabinets. 22 He was not much short of a 
common thug, but he proved to be just the man for the job of restoring 
order. With the aid of several armored trucks and a small group of 
highly disciplined police, he soon had everything under control. Dur-
ing the process, scores of Ghanaian citizens were arrested. When 
asked what he would do if the people resisted the arrests, Edusei, no 
man to mince words, replied, "I would bring out my armored cars and 
slaughter them like hell. "2 3 
Nkrumah was shaken by the anti-government riots and he deter-
mined that should anything of the sort happen again his government 
would be prepared. To that end, he introduced two bills into the Leg-
islature. The first, called the "Emergency Power Bill, " was designed 
to reinstate the emergency powers given by the British to the Governor 
of the Gold Coast Colony during WW" II for use should the country be 
22Edusei had been forced from the earlier Cabinet after being 
named in two corruption investigations. His comment: "Sure people 
give me money, but they never get anything for it." "I love power, " 
Time, I.XX (October 195 7), p. 5 7. 
23 11 Uproot the Enemy," Time, LXXII (November 1958), pp. 26-27. 
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nor the right to suspend all laws for the duration of the national 
emergency. Nkrumah's bill, however, would give him this right even 
though only a local area was affected. The second bill was called 
the "Avoidance of Discrimination" bill, and would give Nkrumah the 
right to ban, without a hearing, any political party "Based on racial, 
tribal, or religious interests. " 
Both bills were vigorously opposed by the United Party. K. A. 
Busia, a sociology professor on leave from Ghana's University College 
and the leader of the opposition, pleaded with the Legislature not to 
pass the bills . He claimed that the first bill armed the government 
with virtual dictatorial power should it feel that the opposition was at 
any time becoming too militant. The second bill he charged would be 
more frankly named the "Political Parties Restriction Bill," which, in 
fact, had been its original name. Both bills were passed into law by 
huge majorities. 
Nkrumah, of course, realized that any serious opposition to his 
party must have the support of the tribal chiefs, and he took advantage 
of every opportunity to remove the threat to his power from that quarter. 
In 1958, Nana Ofori Atta II, the paramount Chief of Akim Abuakwa and 
the second-most powerful tribal leader in Ghana, was declared de-
s tooled (dethroned) by a group of his restive sub-chiefs. When Atta 
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dred policemen to Atta 's Palace. The policemen surrounded the palace, 
took Atta into custody without incident, and returned him under guard 
to Accra. A few days later Atta was deported and a younger chief, 
loyal to Nkrumah, was placed on the throne of Akim Abuakwa. 
The powerful Asantehene (King of Ashanti) had, prior to independ-
ence, supplied the bulk of the financing for Nkrumah's opposition. Since 
independence, however, the Asantehene had lost the support of many of 
the younger, more modernly inclined Ashanti men. In addition, the 
Interior Department, under the capable though slightly heavy hand of 
Krobo Edusei had uncovered evidence of mismanagement of the lands 
and property under the control of the Asantehene. Faced with weaken-
ing support from within and by the threat of an Interior Department in-
vestigation, the Asantehen began making overtures of friendship to 
Nkrumah. Finally, in the fall of 1958, the Asantehene officially trans-
ferred his allegiance to the CPP. 
Thus, by late 1958, less than two years after independence, all 
opposition to Nkrumah was for practical purposes gone from Ghana. 
K. A. Busia, though an excellent scholar, had unfortunately proven 
not to be a very skilled politician nor one of wide appeal for the mass-
es. Under Busia's leadership the United Party had become demoral-
ized to the point where it no longer offered any genuine opposition to 
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Assembly. During 1958 Nkrumah pushed through the Legislature three 
measures which brought forth from the free world the charge of dicta-
tor! The first was the so-called "Deportation Act" which made it 
possible for persons to be shipped out of the country without the right 
of appeal or review in any court and upon mere suspicion if they were 
regarded by the government as "not conducive to the public good. " 
The second act was the "Preventive Detention Act" whereby any per-
sons whose actions were considered "prejudicial to the relations of 
Ghana with other countries or to the security of the state" could be 
imprisoned for up to five years without trial. The final act, and by 
far the most important one, was called the "Constitution Amendment 
Act" and it provided that clauses in the constitution could be changed 
not by a two-thirds majority of both Parliament and the Regional Assem-
blies, as had theretofore been the case, but by a simple majority of 
Parliament alone. 
One thing which had kept Nkrumah from completely having his way 
was the presence of the Regional Assemblies. Under the compromise 
constitution which the British had accepted before granting Ghana her 
independence a system of five Regional Assemblies had been set up to 
serve as a permanent check on the Central Government. Armed with 
the power of the "Constitution Amendment Act, 11 Nkrumah pushed 
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away with the Regional Assemblies. 
All these high-handed political tactics invoked a storm of protest 
from overseas. However, Nkrumah calmly defended his position on 
the grounds that "even a system based on social justice and a demo-
cratic constitution may need backing up during the period following 
independence by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind." 24 
Many of the most educated people in Ghana, including most of the 
white people on duty there, seemed generally to go along with 
Nkrumah. It was perhaps true that Nkrumah had gone too far with 
strong government, but still, in a country like Ghana it is better to 
have too strong a government than one not strong enough. After all, 
over eighty per cent of the people were illiterate and, if there was not 
a firm hand to watch over things, one of the many long-standing tribal 
feuds could easily burst into widespread violence and bring to an end 
any change the country might have of making a success of its inde-
pendence. Nkrumah seemed to think, and perhaps justifiably so, 
that the classic restraints of eighteenth century constitutional liberal-
ism did not fit the situation confronting him. At any rate, Ghana was 
not at that point a totalitarian state, the opposition United Party, 
24c1arence W. Hall, "What's Happening to Freedom in Ghana," 
Readers Digest, LXXV (December 1959), PP. 67-72. 
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newspaper was published daily; and elections were still held. 
In defense of Nkrumah it must be remembered that it has taken 
Britain and America hundreds of years to develop their modern politi-
cal institutions . In fact, an interesting comparison can be drawn 
between the problems which the United States faced in her early days 
and those faced by Ghana in these early years. The United States 
was confronted with the problem of Regionalism vs. Federalism (a 
matter over which we fought a war and still have not completely 
solved) . There was no strong opposition party in the early days of 
our first administration. We had rebellious citizens who resented 
acts of the central government and had to be subjegated by force (the 
WhiskeyRebellion). We too passed naturalization, and alien and sedi-
tion acts aimed at domestic disaffection. The early problems of the 
United States and those of Ghana may not be identical, but they are in 
many ways similar. The fact may well be that the standards of modern 
sophisticated democracies cannot be applied to an emerging country, 
perhaps without strong government there would be no Ghana. At inde-
pendence Nkrumah asked only that his government be judged by the 
·progress in the welfare of the people of Ghana. The people of Ghana 
have undoubtedly forfeited some of their civil liberties; but, on the 
other hand, they have gained a great deal in the areas of education, 
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While Nkrumah's strong-armed political tactics might be thus 
academically defended as being a matter of necessity in a country 
such as his, there is some question as to whether or not the reasons 
so advanced are in fact Nkrumah's reasons. It was pointed out 
earlier that at independence some observers felt that Ghana's real 
troubles would come about as the result of Nkrumah's grand ambitions. 
There is no doubt that before Nkrumah could get on with any plans he 
might have for a United African Federation he must be absolutely sure 
that he stood on firm ground at home. Therefore, it is quite probable 
that many of his totalitarian-like decisions at home were based at 
least in part on such a consideration. 
In December 1958 Nkrumah held an "All-African Peoples Conference" 
in Accra. The purpose of the meeting, attended by representatives of 
most of the independent and soon-to-be independent countries in Africa, 
was to discuss means by which the African nations, through mutual co-
operation, could enhance their individual and collective economic and 
political positions in relation to the rest of the world. The Conference 
members discussed, among other things, the setting up of a common-
25Economic conditions in Ghana will be discussed in the follow-
chapter. 
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by Nkrumah( as well as some misgivings about the proposition and 
nothing much came of it except that a small Secretariat was set up in 
Accra. 
During the months following the conference, there developed what 
turned out to be a seemingly permanent split among the African nations 
over the question of what form cooperation among the nations should 
take. There is no difference in the short range economic goals of the 
two opposing factions, who for ease of explanation may be labeled the 
"Monrovia Group" and the "Casablanca Group," but there is a great 
deal of difference in the long range political goals. Both the "Monrovia 
Group" (Nigeria, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Voltaic Republic, Somolia, Togo-
land, Tunisia, and Sierra Leone) and the "Casablanca Group" (Ghana, 
Guinea, Morocco, The Sudan, and Senegal) favor economic cooperation 
in the form of ending customs barriers between its members, ending 
preferential treatment, establishing some sort of African development 
bank, and the formation of joint air and shipping lines . The difference 
is that the long range aim of the "Monrovia Group" is to increase the 
internal strength of the individual countries in the group, while the 
long range aim of the "Casablanca Group" is to foster a strong econom-
ic and political union among its members. In other words, the "Casa-
blanca Group" would promote cooperation in order to present a united 
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maintaining individual national automony. 
There is a strong suspicion that the split took place because of 
a fear on the part of those nations which eventually went to make up 
the "Monrovia Group 11 that Nkrumah had in mind a little colonization 
of his own. In an agreement signed by Ghana and the former French 
colony of Guinea on 23 November 1958 the United African, or, as 
Nkrumah calls it the "Pan-African" movement, first took physical form. 
Under the terms of the agreement the two countries agreed to harmon-
ize defense, foreign policies, economic policies, and even to adopt a 
common flag. The "Union" was proclaimed by both Nkrumah and Sekou 
Toure, the Premier of Guinea, as the forerunner to a West African 
Federation. 26 
However, the "Union" has been in difficulty almost from the be-
ginning. There is a basic difference in the philosophy of the two strong 
men, Toure was raised as a Moslem and is well grounded in French log-
ic and Marxist dialectics, while Nkrumah is a product of Christian 
missions and Anglo-American education. Because of Toure's Communist 
le~nings, Nkrumah's friends in the free world did everything possible 
to discourage the "Union" and, once it was formed, to keep it from 
26Joseph C. Satterwaite, "New Africa, 11 The Department of State 
Bulletin, XL (February 1959), pp. 19,Ef-197. 
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worlds apart, Ghana being a relatively rich country while Guinea is 
desperately poor. 
In addition, and perhaps most important, Nkrumah realized that 
if Ghana was to be the leader in Africa, he must move rapidly before 
his small country was overshadowed by the emergence of larger and 
more densely populated independent countries. To this end, Nkrumah 
attempted to quickly set himself up as at least the "unofficial" Prime 
Minister of both countries. Toure, of course, was having none of 
that, he like Nkrumah, is a strong man and he did not see himself 
as anyone's shadow. To date, the only recognizable results of the 
"Union" has been that the two countries have exchanged resident 
Ministers, Ghana has loaned Guinea some of the money which was 
promised, and the planes of the state-owned Ghana Airways stop 
2 7 Guinea seems to be the Communists prime target in Africa. 
One-third of Guinea 1 s exports go to eastern Europe. The Toure 
government was the first to recognize East Germany. On the other 
hand, it took a year of wooing by Soviet Trade Missions and 
"cultural 11 Envoys to get Nkrumah to agree to diplomatic ties and 
for another year he raised objections (i.e. no suitable housing for 
Russian staff, no trained Ghanaian Diplomats to sen.d to Moscow, etc.) . 
In March of 1959, Mikhail Sytenko became the first Soviet Minister 
to Ghana. "And The Taint of Red," Newsweek, LIII (March 1959), 
p. 44. 
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Nkrumah has not confined himself to formal agreements in his 
attempt to establish Ghana as the leader in Africa. He made several 
"studies" designed to point out the common heritage of some of the 
tribes in the Voltaic Republic and along the frontier of the Ivory Coast 
with the tribes in Ghana, and thus encourage those tribes to push for 
a union with Ghana. He suggested that certain Ewe tribes in the 
former French colony of Togoland be taken over as Ghana• s "Seventh 
Province." All in all, he seemed generally willing to offer aid and 
comfort to any self-styled "Nationalist" who seeks to throw off 
"colonial shackles." This meant that even in countries which were 
on the verge of independence he often openly supported groups aiming 
to subvert the established order. 
All these things were, of course, designed to further Nkrumah's 
dream of a united Africa; it would appear, however, that they have 
done the cause more harm than good. When Ghana first achieved her 
independence, Nkrumah was regarded by most other African leaders as 
. 28The apparent failure of the Ghana-Guinea "Union" to amount 
to ·anything of significance would seem to lend credence to the views 
expressed by other African leaders at the time of its inception. 
Example: President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia, "Unrealistic 
and Utopian;" Felix Houphouet -Boigny of the Ivory Coast pointed 
~ out that the continents of Europe, Asia, and Americas have never 
achieved unity, he said, ''Why do you think that Africans can?" 
"Happy Impulse, Second Thoughts," Time, (December 1958), p. 29. 
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underhanded tactics in foreign affairs, he has come to be looked upon 
by the leaders of neighboring countries with much suspicion and some 
indignation. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, Prime Minister of 
Nigeria, says, "Nkrumah cannot expect the rest of Africa to dance 
around him: I do not know why you attach any importance whatsoever 
to what Mr. Nkrumah says. " Premier Sylvanus Olympio of Togoland 
says, "the man must be crazy, does he really think he can absorb us 
with his puny bunch of tin soldiers and those two minesweepers he 
calls a navy? 1129 
While Nkrumah's tactics in foreig.n affairs might be considered 
somewhat underhanded, his politics at home continues to be decided-
ly high-handed. 
In truth, it must be admitted that the constitution under which 
Nkrumah's government was originally supposed to operate gave his 
government less power than the British had required to administer the 
colony. On 6 March 196%, Nkrumah moved to remedy this situation 
once and for all. He proposed a new and republican form of constitu-
ti~n to be submitted to Parliament and to the people of Ghana. The 
National Assembly of Ghana, of course, endorsed the proposal and 
29Ghana has a 15% man Navy and two British minesweepers. "A 
Royal Visitor," Time, LXXIV (December 1959), pp. 28-29. 
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constitution and to name the first president. The referendum was to 
be held in April 196,0'. The two million Ghanaian voters were to de-
cide: (1) if they wanted a republic instead of a monarchy under Queen 
Elizabeth II, and (2) if so, who should be the first president .. 
The United Party under the leadership of Dr. Joseph P. Danquah, 
K. A. Busia had fled the country fo take a position at the Hague's 
Institute of Social Studies, campaigned against the dictatorial powers 
the new constitution would confer on the president. Danquah did not 
believe that the people had any idea what they were letting themselves 
in for because, for one thing, the new constitution was printed only in 
English and not in any of the indigenous languages spoken by most 
Ghanaians .. During the campaign the United Party was denied the use 
of the radio and, when Danquah requested that the election be post-
poned because of "widespread terror and intimidation" waged against 
his followers, he was told that nothing was to interfere with the time-
ly and orderly holding of the election. On the eve of the election 
Dr. Danquah made a public statement which said in part, 11 ! am be-
ginning to feel ashamed of having said in the past that we were fit to 
govern ourselves; I was wrong - I am ashamed of the things that are 
being done here in the name of democracy. 11 
The result of the election was never really in doubt. Nkrumah, 
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of his people, and it was a landslide victory for the new constitution 
and for Nkrumah. In May of 196,0' Nkrumah informed Commonwealth 
leaders of Ghana's forthcoming change in status to a republic and 
also of its intention to remain in the Commonwealth .. On 1 July 196,0' 
Ghana was proclaimed the world's sixty-seventh republic with Kwane 
Nkrumah as its first president. 
The new constitution is a rather unique document and does, as 
Dr. Danquah protested, give the president almost dictatorial power. 
Some idea of the extent of this power can be gained by an examina-
tion of Article Two of the constitution which says, "In the confident 
expectation of an early surrender of sovereignty to a Union of African 
States and Territories, the people now confer on Parliament the power 
to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty 
of Ghana. 11 As a result of the election, the CPP held seventy-one 
seats in Parliament to twenty-five for the United Party and, since 
there has never been any question of members of the CPP opposing 
any of Nkrumah's proposals, the Parliament is a "rubber stamp" 
Asse'mbly and Nkrumah has, in effect, the power to surrender the 
sovereignty of Ghana. 
In summary, it appears at this point in time that those observers 
who, at independence, foresaw trouble ahead for Ghana because of 
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States have been proven to have been right. Only the remnants of 
what was once such a promising democracy now remain in Ghana. 
Nkrumah and his followers defend his hard-fisted tactics at home on 
the grounds that no modern nation can tolerate political fragmenta-
tion, tribal or otherwise. However, Nkrumah's policies with regard 
to foreign affairs would seem to put the lie to such a defense and to 
support the contention that Nkrumah feels he must have complete 
power at home if his title of Osagyefo (Deliverer) is to become to be 
known not only in Ghana but over the length and breadth of Africa . 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE INDEPENDENT NATION OF GHANA 
- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS -
It is probably safe to say that no other nation in Africa will 
start its independent life in better financial shape than was Ghana 
in 1957. At that time Ghana's earnings in foreign exchange had 
reached $5%% million a year, the government had $14% million in 
surplus funds, and the Cocoa Marketing Board had reserves of over 
$215 million. Due to its favorable cocoa position, Ghana was earn-
ing $7 .jfff for every $2 .,%,% spent in the United States, and thus had 
a substantial dollar surplus. The per capita income of Ghana was 
double that of neighboring Nigeria and almost four times that of the 
average African per capita income. Ghana was exporting, in addi-
tion to over half of the world's supply of cocoa, 7%% ,jfjfff tons of 
manganese, 7%ff ,ffff.% fine ounces of gold, and two million carats of 
industrial diamonds per year. 
While Ghana's production of manganese, bauxite, gold, dia-
monds, and timber are important to the welfare of the country, it was, 
and is, upon cocoa that the economy is based. Almost four-fifths of 
cocoa crop. Of course, any country which is so dependent on one 
crop is always face to face with a potentially dangerous economic 
situation. If left unattended, the economy would be subject to con-
siderable instability as a result of even small changes in the world 
price of the all-important crop. A significant increase in the price 
of the crop could cause widespread inflation; while a significant 
drop in price would be nothing short of disasterous . The fact that 
Ghana had, at independence,_ achieved a considerable degree of econ-
omic stability in addition to very impressive gold and dollar reserves 
was in large measure due to the efforts of the British-instituted Cocoa 
Marketing Board. 
As previously indicated, there are no large cocoa plantations in 
Ghana. The cocoa is grown on small family farms run entirely by the 
family's own labor or with the help of a few hired hands . In the years 
before WW II, the cocoa was marketed through an intricate system of 
brokers and sub-brokers who acted as intermediaries between the 
farmers and the wholesale buyers. The brokers were Africans; but the 
wholesale exporting firms were European. The Europeans would send 
their agents up country to buy cocoa from the brokers. As time went 
on, many European firms either amalgamated or entered into agree-
ments to restrict competition. In 19 37, the farmers, suspicious that 
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staged a cocoa holdup and a complete boycott of European imported 
goods . The Colonial Government at first took a neutral attitude about 
this dispute between the farmers and the buyers; but, after the hold-
up had continued for several months, finally appointed a commission 
to look ~nto the matter. A truce was declared while the commission 
was investigating the situation. The commission, after lengthy hear-
ings, finally recommended that the old system of marketing be aban-
doned and that a statutory Marketing Board be established. However, 
bef~re the com mis sion.1 s recommendations could be put into effect, 
the war came and the British Government announced that it would buy 
all West African cocoa. This official monopoly, exercised through 
a West African Produce Control Board, continued to handle all Gold 
Coast cocoa until 1947. 
In 1947, the handling of the cocoa was transferred to a newly 
established Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board. The objectives of 
the Board were defined in the statute which established it as being: 
"To secure the most favorable arrangement for the purchase, grading, 
and selling of Gold Coast cocoa, and to assist in the development by 
all possible means of the cocoa industry in the Gold Coast for the 
benefit and prosperity of the producers. 11 30 The Board was empowered 
30w. E. F. Ward, A History of Ghana (London: George Allen 
and Unwin Limited, 1958), p. 4%2. 
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to appoint buying agents, and to license them on any conditions it 
thought fit. The statute which established the Board forbade the 
purchase of cocoa except by the Board or its agents, and forbade the 
export of cocoa which was not the Board's property or which the Board 
had not authorized for export. 
The idea behind the monopoly was that the farmers should be 
cushioned against wide fluctuations in the world price of cocoa. The 
Board would buy cocoa at much less than the world price when that 
price soared, and at much more when it dropped. In a good year it 
would accumulate a surplus, and in a bad year it would pay the farmer 
out of that surplus. 
In practice, things did not work out that way. The price of cocoa 
rose from a pre-war level of $16% a ton to $1, 1%% a ton in 1954. As 
the price of cocoa continued to rise, the Cocoa Marketing Board accu-
mulated a huge surplus. It was finally decided that all of the surplus 
was not needed to insure stable prices, and the surplus was eventual-
ly divided into a "Stabilization Reserve, " earmarked for that purpose, 
and' a "General Reserve" which could be used for any project which 
would benefit the producers. The Board made a large grant, for ex-
ample, towards the establishment of a Faculty of Agriculture at the 
University College of the Gold Coast. 
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great strength to the government of Dr. Nkrumah and to Ghana• s 
financial position in general during the early days of independence. 
Still, in spite of the cocoa reserves, the Gold Coast has always suf-
fered from being exclusively a primary producer. The financial un-
certainty associated with its one crop economy has always hampered 
the country's development. It is to get away from this reliance on 
cocoa that Nkrumah has spent the majority of his economic develop-
ment effort on what has come to be known as the Volta River Project. 
The Volta River Project is the keystone of Ghana's national economic 
policy at the present time. 
It seems that throughout Africa a dam is considered the grandest 
temple, promising miracles of industrial development and richer living. 
The Volta River Broject is, as might have been anticipated, concerned 
chiefly with the building of a dam. However, it is much more than 
just one dam; it is a system of dams and the birth of a whole new 
industry which the hydroelectric power generated at the dams will 
father. 
'The idea of damming the nine hundred mile long Volta River is 
not a new one. In 192,0, when bauxite was discovered on the Gold 
Coast, the first thought was given to establishing an aluminum indus-
try self-contained within the country. In the past thirty-five years 
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which holds leases on ·Ghana bauxite, conducted a study. British 
Aluminum, which is actively mining bauxite in Ghana, conducted a 
study. The famous British consultant Sir William Halcrow, upon in-
vitation from the Gold Coast government, conducted a study. All 
came up with the same answer - the project would be too expensive 
and would make electric rates too high for potential users. 
In August of 1958, the United States government agreed to share 
the cost of bringing up to date engineering reports on the Volta River 
Project. The agreement was the result of a visit by Dr. Nkrumah to 
the United States in July of 1958, at which time the United States 
undertook to examine development plans of the Ghana government and 
to consider particular fields in which it might be able to cooperate 
through development loans. Nkrumah, during his visit, spoke before 
both the House and the Senate of the United States, and he made a 
very favorable impression. The impression was favorable not only 
because Nkrumah is a man possessing a magnetic personality but be-
cause he emphasized in his speeches that, while his country needed 
capital, he was not asking for direct financial aid. He was asking, 
rather, for United States government and private investment in projects 
which could stand on their own feet and assure the repayment of ori-
ginal capital with reasonable interest. This is the kind of talk that 
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for Ghana. 
At any rate, the study was undertaken by Kaiser Industries Cor-
poration and was financed 5/5-5/5 by the U. S. International Coopera-
tion Administration and the Ghana government. In April of 1959, 
Kaiser presented the results of the study. The Kaiser revised plan 
would, by delaying other public works (railways, schools, etc.) and 
changing the site of the main dam to a place where the Volta flowed 
faster, reduce the estimated cost of the project from $9/5/! million to 
$6/!/! million and the estimated time for completion of the first phase 
from eight to five years . 
The revised plan calls for the construction of three dams on the 
Volta River. The main dam is to span the Volta River near Kosombo. 
This dam will be 37/5 feet high and stretch 2, l/!/5 feet across the river 
bed. Behind the dam will back up a 3,275 square mile lake (4% of the 
country's total area and the world's largest man-made lake). Later 
phases of the project call for two additional dams, one to the south 
of the main dam and the other to be built in the northwest so as to 
facilitate supplying irrigation to the arid northern territory. The main 
dam will generate 6/5/5 ,/5/5/5 kilowatts of power (half as much as the 
Hoover dam}; enough to operate a 1/5/! ,/5/5/5 ton electric aluminum smel-
ter to process Ghana• s high grade bauxite and perhaps some iron ore 
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electricity to the southern one-third of Ghana, where over one-half 
of the people live, and thus reduce the country's dependency on im-
ported diesel fuel for generating electricity. In addition to the power 
generated at the dam, the gigantic lake behind the dam would provide 
cheap transportation to the north, a new fresh water fishing industry 
to help augment Ghana's protein-shy diet, and much needed water 
for irrigation. 
The Volta River Project en toto includes not only the dam and the 
smelter, but also the building of a new artificial harbor at Terna. As 
late as the early 192~'s, Lagos, in Nigeria, was the only modern deep 
water port south of Dakar. In 1929, the British constructed a fine arti-
ficial harbor on the Gold Coast at Takoradi. Over the years, however, 
Accra developed as the chief commercial center on the Gold Coast and, 
since Accra has no harbor, goods had to be shipped by land and/or 
railroad via Kumasi or brought ashore by surfboat at Accra. The new 
harbor at Terna, only twenty miles from Accra, will have a drydock, a 
fisherman's harbor, over twenty miles of rail siding, and enough ship 
berths to handle five million tons of cargo a year. The construction of 
the harbor, financed chiefly from Ghana 1 s own reserves , is at this 
point nearly completed. 
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the construction of the dam, the power plant, and the smelter, would 
be about $324 million. The dam and the power plant were to be built 
by theGhana government; the smelter was to be built by a private 
firm. 
In order to raise the estimated $128 million required to build the 
smelter, Kaiser formed and headed up a consortium of international 
aluminum producers called the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO) • In 
addition to Kaiser, the consortium included Reynolds Metal Co. , 
Olin-Mathison Chemical Corporation, and Aluminum Company of 
Canada. Each of the members put up $5/5 ,/5%% to set up VALCO, but 
agreed to commit itself only to the extent of establishing a study group 
to examine the smelter possibilities. Negotiations between the con-
sortium and the Ghana government advanced smoothly to the point where 
Ghana had agreed to give the consortium a ten year tax holiday and, in 
general, a free hand in operating the business in exchange for which 
the consortium agreed to purchase 3%/5 ,)5%% kilowatts of power around 
the clock for thirty years (about seven million dollar's worth a year). 
Then a snag developed in the negotiations over the rates to be charged 
to the consortium for the power. 
Kaiser, with the concurrence of the Nkrumah government, had ori-
ginally estimated that a rate of 2. 5 mils/kilowatt hour would be a 
69 
-----...,- --· _ _...,_ .t"'-••""""' • .&..LVYY~V~.1 I VY.l.lt::::U, J.~~lUUlOU. 0,lJl-J1VQl,;llt:::U Lllt::: 
World Bank for a loan to help finance the construction of the dam, a 
serious discrepancy developed. The World Bank sent its investiga-
tors to look into the feasibility of the project and its probable effect 
on the national economy of Ghana. The investigators were not enthu-
siastic about the feasibility of the project and they set the first stage 
costs considerably higher than the Kaiser estimate. The World Bank 
felt that a rate of 4. 5 mils/kilowatt hour was necessary in order to 
insure Ghana's ability to repay any loan. The Consortium flatly re-
fused to accept such a rate, charged that Nkrumah was trying to jack 
up the rate with the support of the World Bank, and threatened to pull 
out of the project. Kaiser, however, sent its engineers to talk with 
the World Bank investigators and they succeeded in talking the inves-
tigators into agreeing that the Kaiser estimate was, after all, not too 
far out of line. The World Bank talked to Nkrumah, and a rate of 
2 .625 mils/kilowatt hour was finally set. 
The World Bank provided the Ghana government with $4 7 million 
(at 5-3/4% interest) of the $196 million necessary to build the dam 
and the power plant. The British government supplied $14 million, and 
the Ghana government put up $98 million of its own. The United States 
loaned Ghana $37 million from the Export-Import Bank and the Develop-
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on the establishment of an aluminum smelter. 
By November of 196,0', it seemed that everything was in order 
and that work could soon begin on the project. However, in Decern-
her ALCAN withdrew from the consortium, claiming that it already 
had excess capacity and that it was working on a new reduction. 
process which might influence its aluminum smelting in corning years. 
In July, Olin-Mathieson, which was working on a similar project in 
32 Guinea, decided that it was getting in too deep and also pulled out. 
Only Reynolds was left and Kaiser, which had originally figured that 
its participation would be no more than 5,0'%, was stuck with about 
9,0'%. 
Kaiser, now that so much of its own money would be involved, 
began to worry seriously about the threat of nationalization; it asked 
3 lPhilip Siekrnan, "Edgar Kaiser's Gamble in Africa, " Fortune, 
I.XIV (November 1961), p. 128. 
32other large African aluminum projects in planning or develop-
ment stage: 
Guinea-2,0',0' ,,0',0',0' ton plant is being jointly built by Olin-
Mathieson Chemical Corporation, Reynolds Metals Company, 
and France's Pechiney. 
Belgian Congo- The "Inga" Project plans call for a plant 
capable of 5,0',0' ,,0';5,0' tons/year. 
Congo Republic-Plans are being made for a hydro-aluminum 
scheme similar to that in Ghana. 
"Ghana Gambles on Aluminum," Business Week, No. 1548 (May 1959), 
pp. 75-78. 
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Kaiser felt that the guarantee would have to cover not only outright 
seizure by the Ghana government, but also protection against con-
fiscatory taxation and politically inspired labor troubles. The U. S. 
State Department indicated a willingness to do all that was possible 
(Russia had already offered to build the dam) but, since I. C .A. insur-
ance was not broad enough, could see no way of insuring against such 
political risks. Finally, it was decided that under the Development 
Loan Fund the United States government could loan Kaiser $96 million 
to take the place of institutional financing. This meant that Kaiser 
would invest only $ 32 million of its own money, while the United 
States government was now in for a sum total of $133 million. In ex-
change for the loan, Kaiser agreed to continue to operate the smelter 
and to buy the aluminum even if the smelter was confiscated. This 
was necessary since the United States government would have no way 
of collecting any claim against the Ghana government if the smelter was 
not working or if there was no market for the aluminum. 
In May of 1961, Nkrumah accepted a bid from Impresit, an Italian 
construction firm, to build the dam. Work is now underway on both 
the dam and the smelter. The first phase of the Volta River project is 
scheduled to be completed in 1967. 
While events now appear to be progressing satisfactorily for 
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not fairing nearly as well in other sectors of its economy. The source 
of the trouble can be traced, as might have been expected, directly 
to Nkrumah's extra-border illusions of grandeur. In the face of fall-
ing cocoa prices, Nkrumah has spent huge sums on projects which do 
not in. any direct way contribute to the welfare of the Ghanaian people. 
Nkrumah seems unwilling to accept the idea that a young nation must 
begin at the beginning and, as a result, the Ghana government is 
grossly over-committed. 
In the summer of 196jf, Nkrumah announced plans for the state-
owned Ghana Airways to purchase a mixture of Soviet and Western 
turboprop and jet aircraft in accordance with a program designed to 
convert the airline from a regional to an international operator. It 
was obvious that Ghana did not have the money or the business to 
warrant such an undertaking, and the Nkrumah government was the 
first to admit it. Ghana officials confessed that the airway, "is not 
a commercial operation and not trying to be one, 11 and that losses 
were to be underwritten in the hope of making the airway the dominant 
carrier in independent Africa. 33 In September of 196jf, the govern-
ment spent $4 million on a runway at Accra capable of handling jet 
33Robert E. Farrell, "Ghana Builds Flag Carrier for Prestige, 11 
Aviation Week, LXXIII {December 196jf), pp. 38-39. 
73 
of six Russian IL-18 turboprop aircraft at a cost of $1, 82/5 ,%%% each. 
The planes were to be flown by Russian crews until Ghanaian pilots 
could be trained and maintenance, estimated to cost over $2 million 
a year, was to be done initially in Moscow. 
Up to that time, Ghana Airways was operating in the red by about 
$2/5% ,/5%% a year. However, under the management of BOAC officials, 
the Airways 1 deficit had been steadily declining and there was hope 
that within a few years it might be able to pay its own way. When the 
Ghana government, without consulting with the Airways• management, 
decided to go ahead with the costly expansion program, BOAG officials 
threatened to resign. The British government, aware that the Russians 
would be only too happy to move in, asked the BOAC people to stay on 
and to do whatever they could to make the best of the situation. The 
BOAC officials stayed on but the program was, of course, doomed to 
failure. The IL-18's, being extremely complicated aircraft, were con-
tinuously grounded for one reason or another. In one three month per-
iod, August to October of 1961, the planes carried a total of twelve 
paying passengers on the Accra to Khartoun run. 34 
Nkrumah, belatedly realizing the folly of the expansion program, 
asked the Russians to take back some of the planes. The Russians 
34 11 Dirt Under the Welcome Mat," Time, LXXVIII {Nov .1961), 
pp. 37-38. 
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to the DC-3's and De Havilland Herons which the Airways had been 
usinQ prior to the whole disastrous program. The expansion program 
was a complete failure and there is no telling exactly how much money 
was utterly wasted on the project. 
The Ghana Airways fiasco is probably the best, or worst, example 
of Nkrumah's squandering of the government's reserves on projects de-
signed solely to make his tiny country black Africa's recognized leader. 
However, it is by no means the only example. He has spent over $3 
million to redecorate his official residence, and another $ 3 million to 
expand Black Star Square in Accra. To insure that his 6 ,j5jfjf man Army 
and his ljf ,jfjfjf man police force are the pride of Africa, he has pur-
chased modern military equipment from both east and west, even though 
to do so meant that in many cases parts had to be duplicated. He has 
bought out Israel's share in the Black Star Shipping Line long before the 
pre-planned date. Finally, to promote his Pan-African dreams, he has 
loaned well over $21 million to Guinea and Mali. 
All these things cost money - a great deal more money than the 
government's cash reserves could possibly provide. In order to finance 
these and other "improvement" programs, Nkrumah has had to find new 
means of supplementing the government's cash reserves. He has done 
this by, first, pushing through a law authorizing the transfer of the 
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which can be used for whatever purpose the government sees fit; 
and, second, by instituting a new austerity program. 
He has organized all labor unions into a new party-controlled 
"Trades Union Congress" and forbid strikes except by government 
permission. He then dropped the price paid to farmers for their 
cocoa and froze the wages of all other workers. He doubled, through 
an increase in purchase tax, the price of such items as automobiles 
and locally produced beer and cigarettes. He introduced a compul-
sory saving scheme whereby people earning over £ 1,% a month are 
required to invest 5% of their salaries in government bonds. Finally, 
he required that all government contractors be paid in "certificates" 
which could be converted to cash only when the government so per-
mitted. 
Despite these efforts, the government's cash reserves continue 
to dwindle. The world price of cocoa has dropped over 3,%% in the last 
few years and, in 196,%, the balance of payments showed a $75 million 
deficit. Ghana's earnings in foreign exchange dropped below $3,%,% 
million in 1961, as compared with over $500 million in 1957. Increas-
ed import duties have reduced revenue from that source rather than 
increased it; in July and August of 1961 alone customs duties were 
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he will not cut spending, is to nationalize by seizure much of the 
private sector of Ghana's economy. 35 The capital in the private sect-
or of Ghana's economy is, at present, at least equal to that in the 
public sector. It must look very inviting. 
Nkrumah does, in fact, seem to be increasingly showing two faces 
when dealing with foreign investors. With one face he encourages them 
to come in and grow, while with the other he winks at his trust lieute-
nants who talk darkly of nationalizing foreign investment. For example, 
in the summer of 196,0', the government passed a law authorizing a 14¢ 
per day wage increase for miners working in the seven British-owned 
gold mines in Ghana. Since Ghana gets about l/l,0'th of its income 
from these mines, Nkrumah had been subsidizing the shakier mines. 
The wage increase would just about wipe out the benefits of the sub-
sidy. The mine operators, faced with the prospect of operating at a 
loss, threatened to close the mines, an act which would have put 
over 2 ,,0,0',0' Ghanaians out of work. To prevent such action, Nkrumah 
pushed through a bill which called for a heavy fine and imprisonment 
for any operator who closed a mine without his permission. To the 
35Ghana has already borrowed heavily from the East Bloc as well 
as the West. Estimates are that Ghana has concluded about $112 
million worth of aid agreements with Communist countries. "Ghana at 
the Crossroads," Newsweek, LVIII (October 1961), p. 51. 
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nationalization, and they warned Nkrumah that if he seized the 
mines without adequate compensation they would see to it that no 
more British capital would be coming into Ghana for mining or any 
other purpose. Nkrumah assured the operators that he had no inten-
tion of seizing the mines and, to calm the fears of potential investors, 
he offered to buy the stock of several marginal mines at almost twice 
the value listed on the London Stock Exchange. Within twenty-four 
hours, the value of the stock jumped 1,%%% and the relieved companies, 
confident that their stockholders would sell, hailed Nkrumah's offer 
as a uniquely civilized way of nationalizing an industry. 
Still, Nkrumah can not really afford to spend that kind of money, 
and many foreign firms fear that unless Ghana's economy takes an 
upturn nationalization of private enterprise without adequate compen-
sation is inevitable. With this in mind, many firms presently operating 
in Ghana have drawn up plans for quick evacuation of stock and per-
sonnel and new foreign private investment has all but dried up. 
In summary, Ghana has reached an economic crisis. This finan-
cial plight is primarily the result of Nkrumah's delusions of grandeur 
and his determination to make tiny Ghana Black Africa's most potent 
nation. He has spent heavily on modern aircraft, loans to Guinea and 
Mali, and in building up a Pan-African propaganda machine. Ghana's 
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However, things are not all bad. Experts are looking for an 
upturn in the world price of cocoa and the United States decision 
to underwrite such a large portion of the Volta River project and to 
include Ghana in the United States Investment Guarantee Program 
have done much to restore confidence in the economy. There is 
certainly hope that Ghana may yet weather the storm. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing chapters have attempted to trace in some detail 
the economic and political development of Ghana as a model of over-
all West African development. This does not mean to imply that an 
examination of any one country in Africa will necessarily lead to 
conclusions which are applicable to all African countries. In fact, 
the failure of the Pan-African movement to find widespread accept-
ance among African leaders is based, at least in large part, upon 
the presence of widely differing cultural backgrounds and the ap-
parent absence of a common denominator in Africa. All African coun-
tries are by no means the same; there are serious discontinuities 
arising from the existence of different ethnic groups, languages, and 
basic economic conceptions. Individually, the African nations ex-
hibit the greatest diversity in situationr size, population, govern-
ment, and degree of social and economic development; in many cases 
it might seem that the only thing the people really have in common is 
the color of their skin. 
Still, despite these differences, there is an underlying unity in 
the problems faced by all of the new governments . For one thing, 
however they may differ in other respects, all the nations are young 
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without exception, each country's national boundaries were artificial-
ly drawn by the colonial powers to meet some political requirement 
quite external to the African people themselves. The fact that borders 
were established in this way creates an important similarity because 
it means that each of the new government must administer to and for 
a population which is far from homogeneous. In many cases, tribes are 
split in two, cities are divided, and people of the same language and 
cultural background owe allegiance to different flags. 
Throughout most of Africa the strongest personal ties are to the 
family or to the tribe and not to the central government. There is a gen-
eral distrust for any central government, be it foreign or otherwise, This 
means , for example, that direct taxation by a central government is not 
easily accomplished; for most of the people traditionally do not like 
direct taxation no matter by whom it is instituted, and they like it even 
less when it is instituted by what seems to them to be a faraway cen-
tral government. And yet, the fact is that if the new African nations are 
to move in international circles, the governments of these nations must 
have revenue with which to operate and they must eliminate and replace 
the old chieftain-representative type of government because it is much 
too slow for modern needs . 
Because the new African governments have many fundamental prob-
lems in common, and because Ghana, being the first of the new 
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advanced, an examination of Ghana's progress has been undertaken 
in the hope that from such an examination an insight might be gained 
into what can be expected from other new African governments in the 
years ahead. Ghana might, in fact, be a microcosm of the whole 
area of Africa south of the Sahara. 
It has often been said that the character of a people or of an 
individual is formed early in their development. For that reason, the 
early history of the Gold Coast was examined. An attempt was made 
to give the reader some feeling for what sort of a place Ghana is and 
what kind of people inhabit the country. It was shown that the Gold 
Coast, and tropical African in general, was at first nothing more to 
the civilized world than a stretch of coastline. Later, it became a 
hunting ground for slaves, and, still later, was established as a 
British colony during the era of the European "Grab for Africa. 11 
The British followed their traditional system of Colonial Govern-
ment. Most of the authority in the Gold Coast Colony was originally 
in the hands of the Governor and his Legislative and Executive Coun-
cilsi but, as time passed, the authority was gradually transferred to 
elected African officials so that by the time Ghana became the first 
independent Black African nation in 1957 most of the power was al-
ready in African hands . 
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beset other new African nations. Ghana's economy, though too de-
pendent on one crop, was prospering. There was no racialism or 
neurotic nationalism. There was established an efficiently function-
ing civil service. There were educated leaders who were apparently 
well schooled in the democratic ways of the western world. The out-
look was, indeed, bright. 
Things have not, however, gone well in Ghana. Now, only five 
years after independence, the economy is tottering and Kwame Nkru-
mah has come to look more and more like a dictator. Most of Ghana's 
troubles are caused by Nkrumah's drive to become the Simon Bolivar 
of Africa. In the name of democracy and African unity he has abused 
civil liberties in Ghana and over-extended the economy almost to the 
breaking point. 
Still, there is hope for Ghana. Nkrumah is, despite his faults, 
a more than capable leader. When he realizes, as he eventually must, 
that tiny Ghana cannot possibly support his extra-border ambitions, 
the country may yet find its proper place in the community of nations . 
Ghana's experience would seem to lend support to the contention 
that independence does not change the world, it merely creates the 
right economic and political atmosphere for national regeneration. In 
the last analysis, freedom and civil liberties can prevail only where 
83 
The new African nations must learn to begin at the beginning and 
they must be given time to sort themselves out. They will all under-
go growing pains; and we in the western world must be patient and 
we must find a way to harmonize our own interests with those of an 
awakened Africa. 
We have the desire, the science, the energy, and the capital to 
help Africa develop. We must help because Africa must modernize 
and she will do it - with or without us. Either she will have the in-
terest and the support of the West or she will be forced to look else-
where for it. 
We must not permit a country such as Ghana to fail; for if it 
fails a great hope may die out in Africa, and other hopes might be 
sought. But if it succeeds, then there may have begun the addition 
of a whole new continent to the political world - a continent which 
can be our friend. 
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FANTE - Coastal area in the vicinity of Takoradi and Cape Coast. 
GA - Coastal area in vicinity of Accra. 
MOSHI - Western part of Northern Territory. 
EWE - Generally to the east of the Volta River as far north 
as the northern boundary of Ashanti. 
DAGOMBA - Eastern part of the Northern Territory. 
AKAN - Northern part of the "Colony" and generally throughout 
Ashanti. 
GUAN - All along the Black Volta and the Volta Rivers and in 
the area between the Volta and Afram Rivers. 
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